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Inconsistent Reasoning, 'Top-Down Organizing' Practices
Discredit 'Majority Rule' Excuse For Forced Dues

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Apologists for federal and state laws that authorize the firing of employees for refusal to join or pay dues to a labor union typically assume that union affiliation should be a collective, rather than a personal, decision.

Under American traditions of limited government, the decision to contribute to a charity, a political campaign, or a single-issue lobbying organization is made individually or together with your spouse or solicitor. Your neighbors, fellow employees, or business associates may offer advice, but do not get a chance to vote on which private groups you support or don't support.

In the opinion of forced-unionism apologists, however, unions are analogous to governmental entities, not other private groups. As two forced-unionism apologists, professor of management Raymond Hogler and economist Robert LaJeunesse, wrote in a 2002 article, a "fundamental premise of our political system is that citizens will be bound by majority decision through the electoral process and are not free to opt out of basic obligations of support."¹

Citing the late Mancur Olson as their authority, Hogler and LaJeunesse go on to make their analogy between unions and government even more explicit:

[I]f individuals are not free to opt out of which government programs they will support through their taxes, they should not have an option whether to support union collective bargaining activities chosen through secret ballot election. (Emphasis added here.)

As the National Institute for Labor Relations Research has previously pointed out, forced-unionism apologists are remarkably inconsistent in their application of the principle that individual preferences about union affiliation should be subordinated to "majority rule."

If this principle were valid, then when a majority of workers within a government-delineated "bargaining unit" oppose unionization, they should be permitted to vote to authorize the firing of the minority of employees who refuse to pay "fees" to an organization dedicated to the purpose of keeping all unions out.

In reality, of course, this form of workplace "majority rule" is prohibited under the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act.

And no proponent of compulsory unionism has ever publicly advocated that Norris-LaGuardia be amended to allow for the "democratic" firing of pro-union workers who refuse to bankroll a "Keep Unions Out" organization.\textsuperscript{2}

Therefore, quite apart from its dubious assumption that unions should be accorded certain powers normally granted only to governmental entities, Organized Labor's argument that forced unionism can be justified on the basis of workplace "majority rule" fails because it is not consistent with the principle of equal protection under the law.

In contrast, Right to Work proponents believe that both the decision to support a union and the decision not to support a union are personal rather than collective. Therefore, both decisions should be equally protected.

\textbf{Data Indicate Relatively Few Private-Sectors Workers Become Unionized Through a Secret-Ballot Vote Nowadays}

Union officials' invocation of "majority rule" as a rationale for forcing employees who don't wish to join a union to pay union dues or "fees" as a job condition isn't merely opportunistic and inconsistent. It also misrepresents the facts.

\textsuperscript{2} For more on the internal inconsistency of the so-called "majority rule" argument in favor of forced unionism, see Stan Greer and Charles W. Baird, "Reply to Hogler and LaJeunesse," \textit{Labor Law Journal}. Summer 2003, pp. 89-100.
Starting as far back as the early 1980's, if not earlier, secret-ballot elections have not been the preferred route for union officials seeking to obtain the privilege to act as the "exclusive" bargaining agent in negotiations with an employer over a group of employees’ pay, benefits, and working conditions.³

Union officials have increasingly sought to secure "exclusive" bargaining privileges without first allowing employees to vote in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)-sponsored elections despite the fact that NLRB elections are in a number of ways tilted in favor of Organized Labor. Examples of the overall bias in favor of union organizers include:

*** Employers may not promise pay increases or additional benefits if employees vote against unionization. But union organizers are permitted to promise better pay and benefits if the vote goes their way.

Employers are also prohibited from sharing their honest opinion that their plant could be permanently shuttered if a union were voted in and called a strike.

Although they may "express general views about unions," employers are on shaky ground whenever they suggest specific negative consequences unionization may have for their employees, because the NLRB typically assumes that employers have "control" over such consequences.⁴

*** By holding on to the "authorization" cards, signed by 30% or more of employees, that are normally needed to mandate an NLRB election until they believe the time is opportune, union organizers can, in the vast majority of cases, set the time frame in which the election occurs.

Employers and employees who oppose unionization, and believe the union would be defeated if the election were held within the near future, have no way of compelling union organizers to agree to a prompt election. If union officials believe they are unlikely to win an election, they have the established right to prevent it from taking place for many months or sometimes years, even as the organizing drive continues.

But when union officials believe holding the election soon is in their best interest, they may immediately submit authorization cards to the NLRB to set the wheels in motion for an election. In more than 90% of cases, the election then takes place within less than 60 days.\(^5\)

*** Although employers or the agents of employers who oppose unionization are barred from visiting employees at home to discuss an organization campaign, union officers and agents have a legal right to make home visits.

Union propaganda frequently complains about the fact that employers do retain the right to hold meetings regarding a union campaign on company time, as long as no intrusive questions are asked and employees are not solicited to return their union authorization cards.

However, the AFL-CIO's own research indicates that home visits are a far more effective campaign tactic than public meetings. And, unlike employers, union organizers are, of course, permitted to quiz employees about their views on unions and solicit them to hand over authorization cards while under observation.\(^6\)

**Even Some Union Officials Admit Their Responsibility For Failure To Win Secret-Ballet Elections**

Because of union officials' ability to control, in large measure, when NLRB elections take place, and because of the tight restrictions on where employers who resist unionization may campaign and what they may say, NLRB elections are hardly an impartial method of informing employees about the pros and cons of unionization and allowing them to make an informed collective choice.

Nevertheless, such elections do afford employees the opportunity to hear at least a theoretical argument that "exclusive" union bargaining may harm them. And, in the end, they allow employees to vote in secret.

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And the evidence indicates that, to a greater and greater extent, employees who hear even an abstract presentation about the possible downside of unionization are unlikely to believe Big Labor's extravagant promises about unionization's alleged benefits for them.

Back in FY 1970, out of 7773 NLRB-sponsored elections in which unions sought to be certified as the "exclusive" bargaining agent over a group of employees, unions won 4367, or 56.2%. Slightly more than 307,000 employees were unionized as a result of these elections. A decade later, in FY 1980, unions were certified in 3498 out of 7296 elections (47.9%), unionizing just under 175,000 employees.

By FY 1997, the number of certification elections had fallen by nearly 60%, to 3075, of which unions won just 1550, unionizing roughly 93,000 employees.  

The most recent, not strictly comparable data show that by 2001 (calendar year) the number of NLRB elections had fallen to 2378 and the number of employees unionized to under 70,000.

Even some of Organized Labor's fiercest partisans acknowledge that union officials themselves are largely responsible for employees' increasing reluctance to cast a secret-ballot vote for a union.

Communications Workers of America (CWA) union operative Steve Early put it this way in early 2003:

Corruption scandals, contract concessions, strike defeats (like the Teamsters' recent disaster at Overnite), undemocratic internal practices, and shop floor lethargy can leave existing members little enthused about recruiting new ones, and potential recruits much harder to sign up.

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7 "Union Representation Elections Conducted by the National Labor Relations Board, FY 1940 - FY 1997," a table provided to the National Institute for Labor Relations Research by the Bureau of National Affairs, February 11, 1999.


In a March 2001 speech, Carpenters Union President Doug McCarron tacitly acknowledged that straight-jacket work rules imposed by building-trades union officials had made it almost impossible for the union rank-and-file to compete in the marketplace and thus put countless thousands in unemployment lines:

We've been here before, in the 1970's, and we blew it. When we stood at this crossroads then, a boom economy was also tightening down, the industry was demanding more for its dollar. And, we blew it. We thought the problem was yours, not ours. We were getting squeezed by customers who wanted more for their dollar.

And, our answer was to shut down your job while we argued over whether an Ironworker or a Millwright did your rigging. We not only refused to help solve the problem, we refused to admit there was a problem. So, the Business Roundtable came up with their own solution. And when that was done, we had gone from representing about 90% of the market to representing about 30%.\(^\text{10}\)

One might logically conclude from the observations made by Early, McCarron, and other union officials in moments of candor that Organized Labor could greatly improve on its current dismal track record in secret-ballot elections by reforming itself.

But that is clearly not the path that union bosses as a group have chosen.

\textbf{'You Don't Need a Majority or Even 30% Support Among Employees' To Secure a Forced-Unionism Contract}

Instead of striving to improve their image by making genuine reforms, and thus increase their ability to recruit new dues-payers through secret-ballot elections, most union officials have turned away from this form of campaign. The

"top-down" union organizing methods that have spread rapidly since the early 1980's all share a common feature: They do not rely on securing the uncoerced support of a majority of the targeted employees at any time.

More than two decades ago, one major AFL-CIO-affiliated union, the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), reported that it had scored 75% of its organizing successes in 1982 without any election. By 1987, that figure had risen to 93%.\(^{11}\)

While these UFCW victories involved the use of a variety of tactics, they all included procuring an agreement from an employer to recognize the union as employees' "exclusive" bargaining agent through a "card check" rather than a secret-ballot vote.

In a "card check," the employer agrees, often under duress (as shall be explained in detail below), to corral all employees into a union after more than half of them have signed union "authorization" cards. This is quite different from the union organizing methods typically used in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's, when authorization cards were used almost exclusively to mandate that an election take place, rather than to substitute for an election.

In those days, the AFL-CIO acknowledged that collecting employees' signatures on cards proved little if anything. The 1961 AFL-CIO Guidebook for Union Organizers explained:

> NLRB pledge cards are at best a signifying of intention at a given moment. Sometimes they are signed to "get the union off my back." . . . Whatever the reason, there is no guarantee of anything in a signed NLRB pledge card except that it will count toward an NLRB election.\(^{12}\)

And the experience of the last four decades has confirmed again and again that collecting cards from 50.1% of the employees in a government-delineated "bargaining unit" doesn't remotely constitute proof that a union genuinely has majority support.

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\(^{11}\) Yager, Bartl and LoBue, *supra*, p. 44.

As union strategist Joe Crump boasted in a 1992 article written for his fellow union organizers, to win recognition by card check, "You don't need a majority or even 30% support among employees."\(^\text{13}\)

One significant reason why signed cards don't reliably reflect employees' views is that union officials have a long, ongoing history of using threats and subterfuge to obtain them. In many cases, NLRB bureaucrats have given union organizers a green light to employ such tactics.

**U.S. Supreme Court: 'The Unreliability Of the Cards Is Not Dependent Upon the Possible Use of Threats'**

An egregious example is the 1996 *HCF, Inc.* decision, also known as *Shawnee Manor* (321 NLRB 1320). In this case, an employee testified that a union militant had warned her that, if she didn't sign an authorization card, "the union would come and get her children . . .". The NLRB found that this flagrant threat did not constitute an unfair labor practice because the union militant was not a paid union agent and harming or killing people's children was not a "purported union policy." The Board thus reasoned that the signatures collected by the thuggish employee were valid!

In another case brought before the NLRB general counsel in 1997, Clinton appointee Fred Feinstein upheld the validity of signed cards obtained by falsely telling employees they were already under an "exclusive" union contract. Feinstein admitted that a letter sent to new employees by the union "arguably misinforms or misleads employees," but lamely asserted that the "misinformation . . . was not coercive." In reality, the NLRB's own investigation of the matter found that one-half the employees surveyed believed they had to sign a card to keep their jobs.\(^\text{14}\)

Such scandalous incidents represent only the tip of the iceberg. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in 1969's *NLRB v. Gissel* (395 U.S. 575) that cards are simply an inaccurate method of measuring employees' collective opinion. *Gissel* cited as authoritative an earlier federal court ruling that had pointed out:


The unreliability of the cards is not dependent upon the possible use of threats. . . . It is inherent, as we have noted, in the absence of secrecy and in the natural inclination of most people to avoid stands which appear to be nonconformist and antagonistic to friends and fellow employees.

Clearly, Organized Labor officials are not advocating card-check certification because they sincerely believe that cards express the views of a majority of employees more reliably than a secret-ballot election. As recently as 1998, the AFL-CIO joined in a brief to the NLRB insisting that unionized employees must be given a chance to vote in a secret-ballot election before the union is decertified, even if a majority have already signed a petition saying they want the union out.

The AFL-CIO-coauthored brief even quoted the Supreme Court's concern, expressed in the 1954 *Brooks v. NLRB* (348 U.S. 96, 99, 100) decision, that a union's status in a workplace should be "the result . . . of individual decision[s]," not "group pressure."15

When the question at hand is certification rather than decertification, however, union officials have found that "group pressure" simply works better for them than votes cast by individual employees. In 1999, an internal AFL-CIO study found that, although Organized Labor wins only roughly half the time in NLRB secret-ballot elections, it scores victories nearly 80% of the time in campaigns where card checks are used.16

No wonder then, that according to the AFL-CIO's own internal estimate, roughly two-thirds of current private-sector union organizing is done through card checks rather than through secret-ballot elections.17

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15 Joint brief of the AFL-CIO et al. in Chelsea Industries & Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, Inc., Nos. 7-CA-36846, et al., at 13 (May 18, 1998).
'Organize Employers, Not Employees':
Big Labor's Watchwords For the 21st Century?

While the card-check process puts employees under heavy psychological pressure to abide by the wishes of union organizers, convincing employees to sign the card can nevertheless be, in the words of the aforementioned union strategist Joe Crump, "complex and unpredictable."

That's why Crump insists that union officials' watchwords must be: "Organize employers, not employees." He further elucidates:

[O]rganizing without the NLRB means putting enough pressure on employers, costing them enough time, energy and money to either eliminate them or get them to surrender to the union.\(^{18}\)

In recent years, the terms of "surrender" for an employer have come to include far more than acquiescence to union recognition via card check. More and more often, union officials are demanding that employers agree to provide positive assistance to the union organization drive.

Why would any employer in his right mind agree to such a demand? To put pressure on employers to help unionize their employees even if the employees don't want to be unionized, Organized Labor has turned to what are known as "corporate campaign" tactics.

A federal court decision has defined a "corporate campaign" as:

a wide and indefinite range of legal and potentially illegal tactics used by unions to exert pressure on an employer. The tactics may include, but are not limited to, litigation, political appeals, requests that regulatory agencies investigate and pursue [alleged] employer violations of state or Federal law, and negative publicity campaigns aimed at reducing the employer's goodwill with employees, investors, or the general public.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{18}\) Crump, \textit{supra}.  
\(^{19}\) \textit{Food Lion v. UFCW}, 100 F.3d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
A 1990's-era International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) union manual on one common, litigation-heavy form of corporate campaign known as "salting" openly admitted that the tactic was designed to "cause the employer to sign an agreement [forcing employees into the union], raise prices," or "scale back his business activities . . . ." The eventual hope for an employer who refused to be blackmailed is that he would "go out of business."  

Bruce Raynor, general president of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), similarly indicated at the January 2003 AFL-CIO-sponsored "organizing summit" in Washington, D.C., that his new, multi-million-dollar corporate campaign against Cintas Inc., a Cincinnati-based supplier of uniforms, is designed to destroy the company if it refuses to unionize roughly 17,000 of its employees while denying them a secret-ballot vote.

'It's the Right Thing to Do . . . To Break the Back of This Employer'

Raynor admitted that Cintas employees have voted against unionization in 39 different secret-ballot elections. No wonder he holds out no hope of prevailing by making appeals to employees. Instead, he has deployed 50 union organizers for a coordinated campaign that will involve, according to the Bureau of National Affairs, "putting pressure on the company, suing them, getting sued, picketing them, and picketing their customers."

"This will be a financial loser [of UNITE-represented workers' forced-dues money]," predicted Mr. Raynor, but it's "the right thing to do . . . to break the back of this employer."  

In July 2003, 90 Big Labor-'friendly' Democratic members of the U.S. House and self-avowed socialist Congressman Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) cosigned a letter demanding that Cintas consent to a "card-check neutrality agreement" with the UNITE hierarchy.

Disregarding the longstanding views of labor-relations experts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and even, as we have seen above, the AFL-CIO hierarchy itself

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20 The manual was quoted by then-Congressman Harris Fawell (R-Ill.) as he testified in favor of the Fairness for Small Business Act of 1998 (H.R. 3246), on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, March 26, 1998.
that secret-ballot elections give a far more reliable reading of whether a majority of employees want to be unionized than a process in which workers must "vote" in public, the congressmen claimed a "card-check neutrality agreement . . . would be the best option for determining whether or not employees wish to be represented by a union." 22

The "neutrality" part of the agreement promoted by the union-label politicians actually means, in practice, that the employer agrees to join union officials in campaigning in favor of unionization, making the workplace into a kind of one-party state.

Since 2002, several major domestic auto- and truck-parts manufacturers have entered into neutrality agreements with the bosses of the United Autoworkers union (UAW). Domestic automakers GM and Ford, who are seeking deals with UAW officials that would allow them to shut down several factories in contract negotiations that are ongoing as this study is written, allegedly put covert and legally questionable pressure on their parts suppliers to agree to neutrality as a means of softening the UAW bosses' opposition to the GM and Ford factory closings.23

The UAW neutrality agreement with Milwaukee-based auto-parts manufacturer Johnson Controls Inc. (JCI) offers a characteristic illustration of the phenomenon. It includes card-check recognition denying workers the opportunity to cast secret ballots, automatic union access to personal information about employees, including home addresses, a gag rule barring any manager or supervisor from saying anything negative about the UAW or unionization, and mandatory company meetings at which managers extol the merits of the UAW!24

Ignoring the documented destruction of tens of thousands of UAW-controlled auto manufacturing jobs over the past decade, even as overall U.S. auto and auto-parts employment was increasing, the standard manager's speech to JCI employees claims that the UAW hierarchy's "fundamental objectives include providing effective representation for [JCI] . . . employees and maintaining its presence, strength, and influence in . . . the automotive industry . . . ."25

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25 "Johnson Controls 'Captive Audience' Meeting With Employees," NRTWLDF web site (www.rtw.org/d/jci_captive.htm).
At First Blush It Might Seem
Fair to Give Workers the Choice
To Remain Unrepresented

AFL-CIO propaganda is already hailing the JCI neutrality agreement, in which the employer and the union are colluding to deny employees a secret-ballot vote at several plants, prevent them from hearing uncontested facts that might influence them not to join a union, and repeat soothing rhetoric that whitewashes UAW officials' record of corruption and destroying auto jobs, as a model for future organizing drives.  

Today's top-ranking union officials have thus come remarkably close to the seemingly off-the-wall position advocated by radical Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and AFL-CIO lawyer Craig Becker in a 1998 article for the "labor studies" journal published by Queens College, City University of New York. 

Becker denounced the notion that workers should have any say whatsoever, whether as individuals or collectively by secret-ballot or card check, over whether or not they are unionized. 

Employees should not have to "petition the NLRB" or "cast an affirmative vote simply to establish a 'representative process' in the workplace," he explained.

He went on to concede: 

At first blush it might seem fair to give workers the choice to remain unrepresented. But, in granting this option, U.S. labor law grants employers a powerful incentive to campaign for a vote of no representation.  

Mr. Becker's bottom line is that contested elections over "exclusive" union representation simply can't be tolerated.

In light of the fact that Mr. Becker's extreme position on top-down organizing is now, in effect, the same as the one espoused by the most powerful

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officials of the AFL-CIO and its affiliated unions, it is not merely illogical, but
ludicrous, to seek to justify forced union dues and "fees" on the grounds that they
are "democratically" imposed.

When union spokesmen try to claim it is perfectly normal to have
employees fired for refusal to pay union dues by saying, for example, that "there
are situations where the will of the majority should be allowed to govern for the
best of all," the only proper response is one of polite, but complete, incredulity.

28 The quote is by union lawyer Jeremiah A. Collins. He said it during an exchange at the May 3,
2000 hearing on Open Shops in the 21st Century Workplace, U.S. House Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Education and the Workforce
(http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/edu/hedo&i6-105.000/hedo&i6-105.htm).
Stan Greer serves as senior research associate for the National Institute for Labor Relations Research. Mr. Greer holds a bachelor’s degree (1983) from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and a master’s degree (1986) from the University of Pittsburgh.

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The National Institute for Labor Relations Research is an organization whose primary function is to act as a research facility for the general public, scholars and students. It provides the supplementary analysis and research necessary to expose the inequities of compulsory unionism.

The Institute is classified by the Internal Revenue Service as a Section 501(c)(3) educational and research organization. Contributions and grants are tax deductible under Section 170 of the Code and are welcome from individuals, foundations, and corporations. The Institute will, upon request, provide documentation to substantiate tax-deductibility of a contribution or grant.

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Nothing here is to be construed as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress or any state legislature.
### THE PROBLEM

Organized labor has had a profound economic and political impact on the institutions of American power. Yet the far-reaching ramifications of that impact are largely unknown to the public. Academic interest in labor unions and labor relations is at its lowest point in decades.

While there has been a notable proliferation of private interest groups in recent years, none has exposed the excesses of America's union establishment from an academic perspective. Consequently, not enough light has been shed on one of the few remaining forms of tyranny left in America: compulsory unionism.

### THE NEED

Labor policy in America has not reflected the will of its citizenry for decades because Big Labor's support in the academic community has allowed it to control debate. As a result, labor unions have not been subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as their counterparts in the corporate world.

In many cases, the interests and concerns of Americans who support the right to work without compulsion are ignored for lack of an academic support structure. Freedom of association has diminished because its proponents frequently are without the analysis and research necessary to effectively make their case.

Obviously, there is an urgent need for an organization which will draw together scholars and economists to perform objective and revealing research into the practices of America's labor unions. The National Institute for Labor Relations Research is such an organization.

### THE PROGRAM

1. The Institute's primary function will be to act as a research facility for the general public, scholars and students. It will provide the supplementary analysis and research necessary to expose the inequities of compulsory unionism.

2. It will publish monographs, brochures and briefing papers designed to stimulate research and discussion with easy-to-read summaries of current events. The Institute will also conduct nonpartisan analysis and study for the benefit of the general public.

3. It will render aid gratuitously to individuals suffering from government over-regulation of labor relations and will provide educational assistance to those individuals who have proved themselves worthy thereof.

It is high time that self-interested union officials be confronted with the facts on how their brand of unionism has failed to improve general conditions for workers. With an intensive program of study and education, the National Institute for Labor Relations Research intends to do just that.

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