Proposed ‘Paycheck Protection’ Measure in Missouri Would Have Relatively Little Impact
Union dues collecting is examined by Missouri, Kansas lawmakers
Elected officials in the “Show Me” State, like their counterparts in a number of other forced-unionism states, are coming under ever-more intense grass-roots pressure to fight for passage of a state Right to Work law prohibiting compulsory union dues and fees.
The vast majority of ordinary Missourians have long supported the Right to Work principle. But state politicians have been feeling greater heat to make that principle a reality since Indiana and Michigan became the 23rd and 24th Right to Work states, respectively, in 2012. Rank-and-file citizens across the state who have long been told by their elected officials that, although Right to Work is a good idea, “it just isn’t possible,” are especially disinclined to accept that excuse in 2013 now that longtime union stronghold Michigan has a ban on forced union dues on its books.
Eager to fulfill constituents’ wishes that they “do something” about Big Labor abuses, but reluctant to have a direct confrontation with union lobbyists over Right to Work, some Missouri politicians are now touting “paycheck protection” as an alternative. (See the news story linked above for more information.) They tacitly admit that the “paycheck protection” measure now before the Missouri Legislature wouldn’t accomplish as much as a Right to Work law would, but suggest it would be just as substantive a reform as Wisconsin’s Act 10, adopted in early 2011.
But the fact is, Missouri’s “paycheck protection” bill would, if it became law, in all likelihood have only a minor impact by comparison with Act 10. To understand why, you have to know something about what the labor-law status quo in Wisconsin prior to Act 10 was, compared to the labor policies now in effect in Missouri.
In Wisconsin two-and-a-half years ago, just like in every other state without a Right to Work laws on the books, private-sector workers could be fired for refusal to join or pay dues or fees to an unwanted union. This was permissible under federal labor laws that do not affect state and local government employees. However, in Wisconsin in 2010, virtually all types of front-line state and local government employees were also forced to pay union dues under a Big Labor-backed state law adopted in the early 1970’s. Moreover, state law forced state and local government agencies to recognize unions as employees’ “exclusive” (monopoly) bargaining agents on a host of matters concerning their pay, benefits and working conditions.
In Missouri today, union bosses have an array of special privileges, but not to the same degree as in pre-Act 10 Wisconsin. In the private sector, true, “Show Me” State union bosses have exactly the same forced-dues and monopoly-bargaining privileges as they did in Wisconsin in 2010. Actually, Act 10 did not limit private-sector union bosses’ coercive powers at all, so their privileges remain in place in the Badger State even today.
Unlike Wisconsin’s government union officials prior to Act 10, Missouri’s government union officials today have no state statute or court ruling authorizing them to force any employee to join or pay dues to a union as a job condition. Occasionally, compulsory-dues clauses may nevertheless be negotiated in public-sector union contracts, and it would take a Missouri Right to Work law to prevent that. However, in Missouri today public-sector compulsory-dues collections are quite rare to the extent they exist at all. In pre-Act 10 Wisconsin, in contrast, the vast majority of unionized public servants were forced to pay union dues, or be fired.
Another important difference between Missouri today and pre-Act 10 Wisconsin is that Missouri has no statute requiring public employers to recognize a union as employees’ monopoly-bargaining agent. A 2007 decision by the Missouri Supreme Court does force public employers to bargain with unions, but gives no specific guidance regarding the range of subjects over which employers must bargain.
Act 1o has made a major difference in Wisconsin because, even though it does not affect compulsory unionism in the private sector, it protects the freedom of the vast majority of the public employees to get and keep their jobs regardless of whether or not they pay tribute to a union. Another important provision in Act 10 dramatically narrows the scope of public-sector monopoly bargaining. With a relatively small number of exceptions, government union bosses in Wisconsin today only have “exclusive” negotiating control over employees’ base pay rates, and not over benefits, work rules, or special pay incentives for very talented and hard-working employees or employees whose skill sets are in short supply.
The Right to Work and monopoly-bargaining rollback provisions are clearly the core of Act 10. It also includes a provision forcing most government unions to stand for reelection periodically if they wish to maintain their status as employees’ monopoly-bargaining agent, and yet another provision requiring most government unions to collect dues directly from employees who choose to be members, instead of enlisting the employer to have the dues deducted automatically from paychecks. These provisions are moderately helpful, but standing alone they would have done relatively little to curtail Big Labor’s unwarranted power.
Unlike Act 10, the proposed “paycheck protection” measure in Missouri would not revoke the compulsory-dues privileges of a single union boss, either in the public sector or in the private sector. Nor would “paycheck protection” narrow the scope of Big Labor’s monopoly-bargaining power by even a small fraction. Nor would it even require government unions to face periodic election tests among employees in order to maintain their status as “exclusive” bargaining agents.
The only Act 10 provision Missouri’s “paycheck protection” replicates is the requirement that government unions collect dues directly from members, rather than through automatic payroll deductions. By itself, this is a small step in the right direction, but Act 10 in its entirety was a major rollback of Big Labor’s coercive privileges. Missouri’s “paycheck protection” also purports to stop government unions from collecting dues for nonbargaining purposes from members. However, this provision is constitutionally dubious.
Under a series of federal court cases argued and won by National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation attorneys, public servants who are forced to pay union dues as a job condition, but choose not to become full-fledged union members, have a constitutional right to bankroll only collective-bargaining activities, and nothing else. However, in its 1991 Kidwell ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, found that workers who join a union, even under duress, have no right to pay dues only for bargaining activities, and not for Big Labor politics. The only way a forced dues-paying worker can exercise his right not to bankroll union politics under Kidwell is to resign his or her union membership. In the 22 years since Kidwell, neither the Fourth Circuit nor any other federal court has issued a decision contradicting this ruling.
It is remotely possible that the courts would allow the Missouri Legislature to redefine union “member” so that the state could legally restrict how public-sector unions spend members’ dues. But it doesn’t seem like a good bet. The time-tested effective way to stop Big Labor from spending workers’ forced dues on politics against their will is to eliminate union officials’ forced dues privileges. Unfortunately, Missouri’s “paycheck protection” bill would not do that, either in the private sector or the public sector.