Big Labor’s Rise to Power, or Big Labor Never Lets a Tragedy Go to Waste 

WWI; Wagner Act; WWII, and The NLRA: A History of Creating an Extra-Constitutional Class of Union Power

This is a brief summary of a critical historical analysis from the National Institute for Labor Relations Research. It traces how “Big Labor” (union bosses) transformed from voluntary, business-oriented organizations into a coercive political force through legislative exemptions, government-backed compulsory unionism, and judicial battles.  

It contrasts Samuel Gompers’ early emphasis on voluntarism (“No lasting gain has ever come from compulsion”) with later leaders, such as Owen Bieber, who embraced “the persuasion of power.”  

Compulsory unionism—forced membership or dues as a condition of keeping or having a job—began in the private sector in 1935, and with the federal government’s help, it spread like a “cancer” to government workers, and it has eroded worker rights, public services, and democratic processes while enriching labor union treasuries and many union officers.  

However, a “slow march” of Supreme Court decisions has partially clawed back worker freedoms, largely through the efforts of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation. 

I. Introduction: The Reality and Consequences of Compulsory Unionism 

• Core American consensus: For over 100 years, most Americans have opposed forcing workers to join or pay unions to keep a job—yet it became law in the private sector in 1935. 

• Current disparities (as of text data): Government-sector unionization is nearly 4× higher than the private sector (43% vs. 11%). Government growth amplified the problem. [now higher ratio, insert recent numbers]  

• Six major negative effects are listed: 

• Erodes public safety and service quality. 

• Increases featherbedding and wasteful work rules. 

• Raises tax rates and risks government bankruptcies. 

• Fuels illegal strikes and violence. 

• Compromises government security. 

• Spreads a “hate-the-boss” mentality and corrupts politics. 

• Big Labor’s power strategy: First, secure legal exemptions from common-law rules; then use government to force dues collection. Private-sector compulsory unionism funded the expansion into easier-to-organize government workers (low turnover, no market competition) starting in the 1960s. Government-sector compulsory unionism is portrayed as an even greater threat to politics and prosperity. 

II. Seizing Control of Workers: Growth of Compulsory Unionism (19th Century to Great Depression) 

• Pre-20th century: Labor Unions were mostly radical & subversive and lacked the privileges of today’s Unions. British radicals Sidney & Beatrice Webb openly endorsed “enforcement of membership” as equivalent to citizenship. Early American unions still leaned towards voluntary membership. 

• Early 1900s shift to “business unionism”: Under AFL founder Samuel Gompers, unions pursued material gains within capitalism and supported voluntarism. First major legislative win: **Clayton Antitrust Act (1914)**—protected unions from antitrust prosecution (negative protection, not positive government promotion). 

• World War I turning point (1917–1920): Government (under Wilson) actively partnered with unions during the “national emergency.” Actions included mandating work councils, banning anti-union interference, reinstating union members with back pay, seizing companies, and even creating unions.  

The result: union membership doubled to 5 million (12% of the workforce). Union “Membership” Growth was fastest in government-managed industries (such as railroads and shipbuilding). 

• Post-WWI decline: After these “emergency laws” expired, membership fell sharply (labor unions lost 1.5 million members by 1923).  

The lesson learned by union bosses: compulsory government backing = growth and full treasuries; no compulsion = shrinkage and less money. 

• Transportation Act (1920) & Railway Labor Act (RLA) (1926): Railroads returned to private ownership, but with a federal Railroad Labor Board (precedent for special treatment of labor disputes).  

After the failed 1922 strikes, Big Labor pushed the RLA, which imposed compulsory arbitration of grievances, restricted management, and gave unions the upper hand, though without full compulsory membership, yet. 

• Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act (1932): Signed by President Hoover. Granted labor unions immunity from antitrust suits, private damage suits, and federal injunctions. It outlawed the so-called “yellow-dog” contracts (agreements not to join unions). It unleashed unions to use strikes, violence, and intimidation. The immediate result: violence increased, strikes doubled (1932–33) and peaked at 4,740 in 1937. 

III. Compulsory Unionism, the Great Depression, and President Roosevelt’s New Deal 

• Two types of force were applied: (1) Big Labor Intimidation & Violence (government was passive); (2) Pro-active government compulsion (forcing workers to take part in unions). 

• The New Deal Rubber-Stamped Congress: FDR’s first bills (e.g., Emergency Banking Relief) passed instantly with no debate. New Deal laws expanded federal/Big Labor power, often bypassing constitutional scrutiny. 

• An Unintimidated Supreme Court initially strikes down the New Deal: 

• National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA, 1933): Cartel-like codes and Section 7(a) promoting compulsory unionism. Overturned unanimously in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) as coercive delegation of power to private groups, violating due process and minority rights. 

• Bituminous Coal Conservation Act struck down in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) on same grounds. 

• Wagner Act and National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, 1935): Congress rewrote NLRA’s union provisions, and it was signed by FDR. They created three pillars of compulsory unionism: 

• Exclusive representation (monopoly bargaining). 

• Union security (closed shop/forced dues). 

• Mandatory good-faith bargaining. 

• National Labor Relations Board (NLRB): A new pro-union federal agency to enforce “unfair labor practices,” run elections, certify unions, and compel bargaining—described as Big Labor’s “branch of the executive and judicial government.” 

• FDR’s Famous Court-Packing Threat (1937): After the 1936 landslide, FDR threatened to add six justices. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), the Court switched 5-4 (“switch in time that saved nine”), upholding the NLRA despite contradicting Schechter and Carter. Legal scholars attribute the flip to FDR’s obvious intimidation rather than to jurisprudence. 

• Explosive Growth: Unsurprisingly, forced labor union membership increased the number of dues payers from 2.8 million (1933) to 8.4 million (1941) and peaked at 25.2% (16 million plus) by 1952. Government compulsion prevented previous post-WWI-style declines. 

IV. Unpatriotic Strikes Lead to State Right to Work Laws 

• WWII & Postwar Strike Wave: There were over 13,000 strikes during WWII to the joy of the Japanese and Germans; and a record 5,000 strikes (4.6 million workers, 116 million man-days idle) in 1946. Public outrage followed. 

• Taft-Hartley Act (1947): Passed over Truman’s veto by a Republican Congress. Key reforms: 

• Section 14(b): States may pass Right-to-Work (RTW) laws banning forced union dues and forced union membership. 

• Unfair labor practices now apply to unions. 

• Closed shops (union members only) banned. 

• Limits of Taft-Hartley: However, it only clawed back some rights; it preserved monopoly bargaining (forcing non-members to be controlled by unwanted unions) and forced dues in non-RTW states. By 1965, 19 states (now 21 per text at the time of the original report, and in 2026, there are 26 Right to Work States) had Right to Work laws. 

• Railway Labor Act Amended (1951): Extended forced-dues provisions to match NLRA – this was a complete Big Labor victory. 

V. Government Worker Compulsory Unionism 

• Early 20th century: Banned until Lloyd-LaFollette Act (1912) (postal workers) and Keiss Act (1924) (Government Printing Office). Membership grew modestly (61,000 → 92,000 by 1917). Federal law still banned forced dues and strikes. 

• FDR Opposed Government Unions: FDR called public-employee strikes “unthinkable and intolerable.” 

• Post-1950 acceleration: By allowing State Right-to-Work protections, courts assumed that the Taft-Hartley Act implicitly permitted states without protections to impose compulsory unionism. State and local unionized workers nearly doubled (183,000 in 1947 → 341,040 in 1961). 

• Kennedy’s Executive Order 10988 (early 1960s): Actively encouraged union formation and bargaining. Federal union membership doubled (600,000 → 1.2 million by 1972). Triggered an “avalanche” of state/local laws. 

• Explosive state/local growth: 341,000 (1961) → 1.9 million (1965) → nearly 5 million (1976). By 1981, 39 states + D.C. + Virgin Islands had collective-bargaining frameworks. 

VI. Big Labor and Government Workers — Compulsory Unionism Today (Original Text’s Era) 

• Government unions now dominate: NEA (2.1 million) and AFSCME (1.2 million) are two of the three largest U.S. unions. 

• 1996 data: 6.8+ million government members + 1.2 million non-member agency-fee payers; 43% unionization rate (vs. 11% private). 

• Consequences: bondage of employees, poorer service, and higher spending/taxes. 

VII. Chapter 2: “Workers’ Rights vs. Union Power: The Slow March Toward Freedom” 

• Introduction: Jefferson’s quote against compelled support for disbelieved opinions. Compulsory unionism is still legal in 29 non-Right to Work states; even in Right to Work states, enforcement is weak, and workers’ trust is exploited. 

• Court battles (1956–1991)—Supreme Court gradually limits forced-dues abuses (especially for politics), many of these cases were driven by National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation cases: 

• Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson (1956): Upheld RLA forced dues/exclusive representation, but hinted politics might be off-limits. 

• International Association of Machinists v. Street (1961): First major blow—forced dues cannot fund politics (statutory, not constitutional ruling). 

• Allen & NLRB v. GM (1963): Burden of proof on unions; workers reduced to “financial core” (agency fees only for bargaining); outlawed formal compulsory membership. 

• Abood (1977): Extended protections to the public sector—First Amendment bars forced dues to politics. (NRTW Case) 

• Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks (1984): Unions cannot temporarily use dissenters’ money; must subtract (not rebate) improper expenditures. (NRTW Case) 

• Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson (1986): Landmark due-process win—requires independent audit, upfront financial disclosure, prompt impartial hearings; enables class actions. (NRTW Case) 

• Harry Beck v. CWA (1988): Private-sector equivalent of Abood/Hudson; 79% of CWA dues ruled non-chargeable. (NRTW Case) 

• Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association (1991): 3-part First Amendment test for chargeable activities. 

• Harris v. Quinn (2014): The U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits a state from compelling home health care personal assistants—who are not full-fledged public employees—to pay agency fees to a union they do not wish to join. (NRTW Case) 

• Janus v. AFSCME (2018): The U.S. Supreme Court held that public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from non-consenting employees, ruling that such compelled payments violate the First Amendment (overruling the 1977 Abood precedent) (NRTW Case) 

• Ongoing reality: Big Labor Union Officials often ignore rulings; millions of employees are still unaware of their rights; full restoration of voluntarism stays incomplete. 

This is an unfinished struggle: Big Labor’s rise relied on political arm-twisting pressures and judicial intimidation, while employee freedom has advanced primarily slowly through persistent litigation and word of mouth about your rights.